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Pathological Racism, Chronic Racism & 
Targeted Universalism 
Guy-Uriel E. Charles* & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer** 
Race and law scholars almost uniformly prefer antisubordination 
to anticlassification as the best way to understand and adjudicate 
racism. In this short Essay, we explore whether the antisubordination 
framework is sufficiently capacious to meet our present demands for 
racial justice.  We argue that the antisubordination approach relies on 
a particular conception of racism, which we call pathological racism, 
that limits its capacity for addressing the fundamental restructuring 
that racial justice requires. We suggest, in a manner that might 
be viewed as counterintuitive, that targeted universalist remedies 
might be more effective to address long term racial inequality 
but might also be the more radical approach to addressing racial 
discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
More than ten years ago, in a pathbreaking article, the iconic equality 
scholar, john powell—in a tribute to another legendary equality scholar, John 
Calmore—observed in the course of reviewing the state of the racial justice 
scholarship, “we arrive at a vista within which race remains a central organizing 
theme of American society, but in which our understanding of racism is 
inadequate to the task of addressing it.”1 Professor powell used the occasion and 
the insights that he derived from Professor Calmore’s work to express the 
inadequacies of the then-dominant theories of racism in the academy. “The older 
notions of individual and institutional racism,” Professor powell noted, “while 
still relevant, cannot capture the important structural dynamics that shape the 
lives of people of color today.”2 Professor powell went on to propose “a 
structural model for conceptualizing racism in its advanced, contemporary form 
that will help us to realize both an economically and racially just society.”3 
Professor powell is among an impressive group of racial justice scholars 
who have contributed to a robust legal literature that has pushed back against 
what these scholars view as the fundamental failures of the Supreme Court’s race 
jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that is often described as using an 
anticlassification framework to resolve racial equality claims. The 
anticlassification framework essentially defines racism as government 
behavior—often referred to as state action—that categorizes individuals on the 
basis of race, or state action that is motivated by race.4 Racial justice scholars 
have argued that this anticlassification approach is ill-suited to identify racism 
as it manifests itself in our society because the anticlassification approach is too 
individualistic, too attentive to the search for discriminatory intent, too 
preoccupied by colorblindness as a prescriptive and normative telos.5 Racial 
justice scholars have sought to reorient equality law and the Court’s racial justice 
jurisprudence away from anticlassification toward an approach that scholars 
have generally referred to as antisubordination.6 
 
 1. john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 791, 793 (2008). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642–43 (1993) (“Express racial classifications are 
immediately suspect because, ‘[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry . . . , there is simply no way of 
determining what classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are in fact 
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.’” (quoting Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion))). 
 5  See Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Color of Perspective: Affirmative Action and the Constitutional 
Rhetoric of White Innocence, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 477 (2006); Randall Kennedy, Colorblind 
Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 14 (2013). 
 6  See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of 
America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1329, 1403, 1404–05 (1991) (“[T]he antisubordination principle . . . can inform our law in a way 
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To the extent that there is a consensus, what we will refer to here as the 
racial equality consensus among racial justice scholars is the rejection of 
anticlassification—and its constituent parts: individualism, discriminatory 
intent, and raceblindness—as a way of understanding racism. At the same time, 
it is a wholehearted embrace of antisubordination—and its constituent parts: 
structuralism/institutionalism, discriminatory impact, and raceconsciousness—
as the proper frame for adjudicating racial equality disputes. The racial equality 
consensus presupposes that if the Court’s racial justice jurisprudence eschewed 
anticlassification (and its individualism, discriminatory intent, and 
raceblindness) as an approach to racial equality in favor of antisubordination 
(and therefore structuralism/institutionalism, discriminatory impact, and 
raceconsciousness), the doctrine could more accurately address the manner in 
which racism manifests itself in our society. More specifically, and as we explain 
in Part I, racial justice scholars have generally viewed a structural/institutional 
approach as critical to the racial equality agenda and the pivotal component of 
the antisubordination approach. Consequently, racial justice scholars have called 
upon the Court to embrace a structural/institutional understanding of racism. 
In this short Essay, building on the work of racial justice scholars and 
leveraging our expertise as scholars of both voting rights and race, we suggest 
that the current racial equality consensus, particularly its reliance on an 
antisubordination approach, is still incapable of meeting current demands for 
racial justice. The antisubordination approach owes too much to a particular 
conception of racism—what we call pathological racism—to do the work that 
racial justice scholars and activists demand in the twenty-first century. We will 
contend that pathological racism no longer describes the modal expression of 
racism in the twenty-first century. Racism is best understood as chronic and not 
pathological.7   
A core animating assumption of pathological racism—therefore, of the 
antisubordination framework—is the evanescence of racism and the faith that 
racism can be eradicated with sufficient efforts. Racism is an abnormality, a 
deviation that can be fixed or cured. The antisubordination approach is therefore 
always haunted by an existential question: whether current remediation 
approaches, which are always viewed as a deviation from a moral or 
constitutional baseline, have fixed the problem and if they have not fixed the 
problem, how much longer will it take so that we can return to the proper moral 
or constitutional baseline. 
By contrast, chronic racism operates on the assumption that racism is 
permanent. If racism is permanent, it is not sensible to ask whether current 
remedial efforts have eradicated racial discrimination. It is only sensible to ask 
 
that is as principled and as disciplined as the ideas of property, equality, and due process that are our 
constitutional legacy.”). 
 7. For an extremely thoughtful approach advancing a similar argument, see Elise C. Boddie, 
Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235 (2016). 
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whether current remedial efforts represent the best that we can do to minimize 
racism’s impact on our society. 
Chronic racism, as a conception of racism, is not without its faults. It raises 
epistemic questions about particular manifestations of racism and it raises doubts 
about the futility of remedial efforts. In particular, if racism is permanent, why 
bother trying to contain it?8  
But facing up to chronic racism also opens up new possibilities. 
Specifically, we suggest that racial justice scholars ought to consider, with 
renewed vigor, the possibilities for addressing racial inequality presented by 
universal remedies, particularly targeted universal remedies.9 
We make two fundamental points in this Essay. First, we suggest that racial 
justice scholars should abandon the antisubordination approach; it has run its 
course. Instead, scholars should focus on the implications for policy, racial 
justice scholarship, and the Court’s jurisprudence if we take seriously the claim 
that racism is chronic and permanent. Second, if racial justice scholars adopt 
chronic racism as the dominant conception of racism, we will also have to 
explore, with a renascent seriousness, the utility of universal remedies for 
addressing racial justice problems. 
The Essay develops over six parts. Part I reviews the scholarship on 
structural/institutional racism and its call that the Court should employ a 
structural/institutional frame to address claims of racial justice. Part II uses the 
landmark voting rights case of South Carolina v. Katzenbach to show that the 
Court has in fact employed an antisubordination and structural approach in its 
Voting Rights Act (VRA) jurisprudence. Part III argues that Katzenbach’s 
structural/institutional approach was justified under a particular conception of 
racism that we call pathological racism. Part IV uses Shelby County v. Holder to 
argue that the Court abandoned the structural/institutional approach because 
pathological racism has become a less compelling way to understand how racism 
manifests itself in American society. Part V explores a different way of thinking 
about racism, which we call chronic racism. This part also explains why a 
structural/institutional approach is hard to justify if chronic racism is the 
underlying conception of racism. Finally, Part VI suggests that racial justice 
scholars might alternatively consider universalist remedies to structural and 
institutional racism, particularly if they agree with us that chronic racism is the 
most accurate description of how racism operates in the American context. This 
 
 8. See id. at 1302–04 (arguing that “[e]xisting constitutional doctrine demands that we see 
racial discrimination as narrow, siloed, and time limited,” which leads to the question “whether law can 
do anything”). 
 9. Here, too, Professor john a. powell has been at the forefront of this new approach. See, e.g., 
john a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 685 (2009); john a. 
powell, Stephen Menendian & Jason Reece, The Importance of Targeted Universalism, POVERTY & 
RACE, Mar.–Apr. 2009, http://ceelo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/The-Importance-of-Targeted-
Universalism.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9WZ-YMH8]. 
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Part also suggests that universalist remedies are sometimes both the more radical 
and the more effective solution to structural and institutional racial harm. 
I. 
ANTICLASSIFICATION & ANTISUBORDINATION 
This Part provides a brief overview of the two dominant approaches to 
racial justice: anticlassification and antisubordination. Racial justice scholars 
have long viewed the Court’s traditional racial justice jurisprudence, which 
scholars have dubbed anticlassification jurisprudence, as too individualistic,10 
too committed to colorblindness,11 and too bound by the rigid ideology of formal 
equality to meet the needs of racial justice12—at least as most scholars of color 
understood the aims of racial justice. 
In the standard doctrinal account of the anticlassification model, the 
government, which is the only actor of consequence in the model, cannot favor 
or disfavor an individual because of the individual’s race. The government 
cannot classify on the basis of race, nor, according to the pathbreaking 1976 case 
of Washington v. Davis and the line of cases that followed in its wake, can the 
government’s regulation be motivated by a purpose to engage in racial 
discrimination, even if the government’s classification is racially neutral on its 
face.13 
The anticlassification framework reflects a deep skepticism of race-based 
decision-making by the government because race is almost always an irrelevant 
criterion for choosing an individual for advantage or disadvantage. There is very 
little to gain and much to lose if the government is allowed to classify individuals 
by race or use race as a basis for decision-making. Race-based decision-making 
by the government is more than likely an expression of racial animus, which is 
prohibited by the Constitution’s equality norms. If race-based decision-making 
by the government is more often than not illegitimate, it therefore follows that 
the solution, almost by definition, is to compel the government to ignore race 
when doling out benefits and burdens. 
 
 10. See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Subordination and the Fortuity of Our Circumstances, 41 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 588 (2008). 
 11.  See, e.g., Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with Equal 
Protection, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1243, 1272–73 (2014) (entirely removing race as a consideration and, 
as a result, “impugn[ing] affirmative action policies, . . . [while] legitimat[ing] facially neutral laws that 
have a disparate racial impact”). 
 12. See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 541 (2018) 
(“An anticlassification approach (also known as antidifferentiation) focuses on formal equality and 
equal treatment of individuals.”); see also Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 963 (2012) (analyzing the limitations of 
anticlassification’s emphasis on formal equality). 
 13. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pers. Adm'r v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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The anticlassification framework owes it relevance, and arguably its 
existence, to the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education.14 
Antisubordination, by contrast is of later vintage. Between the late 1960s and 
mid-’70s, scholars began to articulate the distinction between what would 
eventually be identified as the anticlassification and antisubordination 
approaches. In 1967, political activist Stokely Carmichael, later known as 
Kwame Ture, and sociologist Charles Hamilton coined the term “institutional 
racism” to identify acts by the total white community against the Black 
community.15 In contrast, “individual racism” referenced acts by “individual 
[W]hites acting against individual [B]lacks.”16 Thus, Ture and Hamilton not only 
juxtaposed the concept of individual racism against that of institutional racism, 
they also added another binary—overt versus covert.17 
In 1976, legal scholar Owen Fiss more thoroughly developed the 
antisubordination theory of antidiscrimination in his influential article “Groups 
and the Equal Protection Clause.”18 The article “inaugurated the 
antisubordination tradition in legal scholarship of the Second Reconstruction.”19 
The article also inaugurated the standard critiques of the Court’s 
anticlassification doctrine. Fiss offered two major objections. First, he argued 
that the Court’s traditional approach to interpreting the Equal Protection Clause 
“embodies a very limited conception of equality, one that is highly 
individualistic and confined to assessing the rationality of means.”20 Second, 
Fiss advanced a principle of equality “that takes a fuller account of social reality, 
and one that more clearly focuses the issues that must be decided in equal 
protection cases.”21 Fiss then went on to articulate a theory that he called 
antidiscrimination but that scholars later identified as antisubordination:22 the 
Equal Protection Clause is violated when the government classifies in a manner 
that “aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially 
disadvantaged group.”23 Fiss argued that “[i]t is from this perspective—one of a 
proscription against status-harm—that discriminatory state action should be 
viewed.”24 
 
 14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an argument about the development of the anticlassification 
framework, its relationship to Brown, and how anticlassification is sometimes at peace and sometimes 
at war with antisubordination, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004). 
 15. KWAME TURE & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION 
4 (Vintage ed. 1992) (1967). 
 16. Id. at 4. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 107, 107 
(1976). 
 19. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 6, at 9. 
 20. Fiss, supra note 18, at 108. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 157. 
 24. Id. 
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A few weeks after Fiss published his theory of equality that emphasized 
group disadvantage, the Court decided the case of Washington v. Davis.25 If there 
is a poster child of the anticlassification model, it is certainly Washington v. 
Davis. For racial justice scholars, Davis is the poster child for much of what is 
wrong with the Court’s race jurisprudence.26 Indeed, one can think of the 
antidiscrimination project of the post-Civil Rights era as an extensive campaign 
against the standard of constitutional equality that the Court defined in Davis. 
In Davis, Black plaintiffs filed suit alleging that a qualifying test 
administered to individuals applying for jobs as police officers in the District of 
Columbia was racially discriminatory in violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.27 The fundamental question in the case was whether 
administering a screening test that had a disproportionate negative impact on 
Black applicants violated constitutional norms of equality.28 
In an opinion for the Court, Justice White exclaimed that the “central 
purpose” of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
“is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”29 
White went on to declare “the basic equal protection principle,” which is “that 
the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”30 A law that is neutral 
on its face—that is a law that does not explicitly classify on the basis of race—
is not unconstitutional even though it might have a disproportionate racial 
impact, unless the law was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Justice White 
granted that disproportionate impact is relevant to the discriminatory purpose 
inquiry; disparate impact might be evidence of discriminatory purpose. But 
discriminatory impact standing alone is not unconstitutional; discriminatory 
purpose is the sine qua non of the constitutional inquiry.31 
Starting with Fiss and in the wake of Davis, scholars of law and equality 
have generally understood that the American legal system generally reflects two 
primary understandings of equality: anticlassification and antisubordination, two 
 
 25. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 26. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (asserting that “[m]inorities and civil rights 
advocates have been virtually unanimous in condemning Davis and its progeny” and siding with the 
critics); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 953 
(1989) (calling the Court’s holding in Washington v. Davis “problematic”). 
 27. Davis, 426 U.S. at 229. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 239. 
 30. Id. at 240. 
 31. See id. at 242. 
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theories that sometimes are in tension32 and sometimes operate symbiotically.33 
To some extent, anticlassification is an umbrella term that subsumes three 
particular elements: individualism, discriminatory intent, and raceblindness. 
Likewise, antisubordination also serves as a shorthand for three factors: 
structuralism/institutionalism, discriminatory impact, and raceconsciousness. 
These two understandings of equality is what Professor Khiara Bridges has aptly 
described as the “racial discrimination binary,”34 in which antisubordination or 
anticlassification “constitute the universe of” possibilities.35 This is true not just 
of the anticlassification and antisubordination binaries but of their constituent 
parts. Thus, individualism is positioned against structuralism/institutionalism. 
Discriminatory intent is pitted against discriminatory impact. And 
raceconsciousness is aligned against raceblindness.36 
II. 
ANTISUBORDINATION & THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
As a general matter, racial justice scholars characterize the Court’s racial 
justice jurisprudence as furthering the aims of either anticlassification or 
antisubordination. Between these two theories that form the racial discrimination 
binary, racial justice scholars have a clear preference for antisubordination over 
anticlassification. There is near-universal agreement among racial justice 
scholars that the anticlassification approach both misunderstands the manner in 
which racism operates in American society and is incapable of achieving the 
aims of racial justice. The plaint of racial justice scholars has been that the Court 
should abandon the anticlassification model in favor of antisubordination. For 
racial justice scholars, the only way for the Court’s jurisprudence to attack the 
White supremacist racial structure at its roots is for the Court to adopt an 
antisubordination approach.  
Using the Voting Rights Act and South Carolina v. Katzenbach as an 
example, however, we show in this Part that the problem with the Court’s racial 
justice jurisprudence is not its failure to apply an antisubordination approach to 
achieving racial equality. It has been willing to do so. As we will argue elsewhere 
in this Essay, the problem is inherent in the theory of antisubordination itself.  
 
 32. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Bottlenecks and Antidiscrimination Theory, 93 TEX. L. REV. 415, 415 
(2014) (reviewing JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (2014)) 
(“In American antidiscrimination theory, two positions [anticlassification and antisubordination] have 
competed for primacy.”).  
 33. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 6, at 10–11 (noting that “American civil rights jurisprudence 
vindicates both anticlassification and antisubordination commitments”). 
 34. Khiara M. Bridges, Excavating Race-Based Disadvantage Among Class-Privileged People 
of Color, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 85 (2018). 
 35. Id.  
 36. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, Where Race Meets Class: The 21st Century Civil Rights Agenda, 
12 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2005). 
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The Voting Rights Act of 196537 is widely regarded as one of the most, if 
not the most, consequential civil rights statute ever passed by Congress. The Act 
was designed to address the Nation’s history of racial discrimination, particularly 
as it manifested itself in the South. The Act attempted to remedy racial 
discrimination—not from a traditional anticlassification approach but from an 
antisubordination one. As it was enacted in 1965, the Act contained a number of 
provisions, but four were particularly controversial.  
First, the Act employed what its advocates referred to as a coverage formula 
to identify the jurisdictions with some of the worst history of racial 
discrimination. Under section 4(b) of the Act, the coverage formula, a 
jurisdiction would be subject to certain provisions of the Act if (a) it used a 
literacy test or similar test or device as a voting qualification and (b) less than 50 
percent of its eligible voters were either registered to vote or voted in the 1964 
presidential election.38 Supporters of the Act referred to jurisdictions that met 
both of the section 4(b) criteria as “covered jurisdictions.” Second, section 4(a) 
of the Act prohibited covered jurisdictions from using literacy tests and similar 
devices as voting qualifications for a period of five years.39 
Third, under section 5 of the Act, covered jurisdictions were not allowed to 
implement new voting rules unless those rules were reviewed by federal 
authorities and federal authorities concluded that the new rules would not 
maintain racial discrimination.40 Fourth, the VRA provided for federal 
examiners, both in covered and non-covered jurisdictions to prepare and 
maintain voting lists when the Attorney General had reasons to believe that these 
jurisdictions were engaged in racial discrimination in voting.41 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,42 South Carolina argued that Congress 
did not have the constitutional authority to pass these most controversial 
provisions of the Act. In particular, South Carolina objected strongly to section 
4(a) of the Act, which enjoined the State from enforcing its requirement that 
voters pass a literacy test as a precondition to voting.43 South Carolina and its 
allies offered a number of constitutional arguments. But their main argument was 
that the Constitution granted the authority to the States to set voter qualifications, 
such as literacy tests, and not to Congress.44 Therefore, they argued, Congress 
exceeded its authority by trying to stop the states from doing something they had 
a constitutional right to do.45 South Carolina and its allies, by necessity, also 
 
 37. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.). 
 38. § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 438. 
 39. § 4(a), 79 Stat. at 438. 
 40. § 5, 79 Stat. at 439 . 
 41. § 3(a), 79 Stat. at 437; § 7, 79 Stat. at 440. 
 42. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 323.  
 45. See Oral Argument at 00:05:06, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (No. 
22-orig), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1965/22_orig [https://perma.cc/F8WN-K25G] (stating that “the 
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attacked the coverage formula on the ground that a jurisdiction’s use of a 
prerequisite to voting or its low voter registration or turnout did not necessarily 
mean that a jurisdiction had engaged in racial discrimination.46 South Carolina 
argued that Congress did not have proof that the State had engaged in racial 
discrimination and even if it did, Congress did not have the power to enact the 
coverage formula.47 This is because, South Carolina argued, Congress has the 
power only to remedy violations of the Constitution, not to determine whether 
the Constitution has been violated. To the extent that the formula identified 
jurisdictions that were engaged in racial discrimination, Congress did not have 
the power to preclude those jurisdictions from using a test or device as 
prerequisite to voting because only courts have the constitutional authority to 
adjudicate constitutional violations.48 Congress can only impose a remedy once 
a court has made a finding that the Constitution has been violated.49 
South Carolina’s constitutional arguments were not frivolous, at least not 
in toto. In particular, South Carolina’s objection that Congress was regulating in 
an area, voting qualifications, which the Constitution reserves to the states is 
supported by a long line of Supreme Court precedent. For example, just a few 
years before its decision in Katzenbach, in 1959, the Court decided Lassiter v. 
Northampton County Board of Elections,50 in which it (rather easily) upheld 
North Carolina’s literacy test against constitutional challenge. Quoting from 
Guinn v. United States,51 a case better known for striking down Oklahoma’s 
grandfather clause but also upholding that State’s literacy requirement, the Court 
stated that a literacy test is “but the exercise by the State of a lawful power vested 
in it not subject to our supervision.”52 The Court in Lassiter then declared: “The 
States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions 
under which the right of suffrage may be exercised.”53 The Court cited two early 
twentieth-century cases and various provisions of the Constitution in support of 
the proposition that reasonable voting qualifications are completely within the 
bailiwick of the States.54 
 
Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress no power to suspend lawful reasonable voter qualification 
proscriptions of the States”). 
 46. See id. at 00:23:52 (“What Congress has really said by picking these factors is that, South 
Carolina, if you have a literacy test, if you have a lot of illiterates, you’re bound to be guilty of racial 
discrimination.”). 
 47. See Brief of the Plaintiff, Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1965) (No. 22), 1965 WL 130083. 
 48. Id. at 325. 
 49. See Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 00:41:36 (“The Fifteenth Amendment power is the 
power to enforce by legislature. We submit that this section constitute [sic] a congressional 
adjudication . . . .”). 
 50. 360 U.S. 45, 54 (1959). 
 51. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
 52. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (quoting Guinn v. 
United States, 238 U.S. 347, 366 (1915)). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 50–51. 
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Though the Lassiter majority conceded that a State may not require its 
voters to comply with “any standard” the State desires, it nevertheless reasoned 
that “there is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction.”55 The Court explicitly 
noted that literacy tests, residency requirements, age restrictions, and exclusions 
for criminal convictions are easily within a State’s purview.56 The Court was, 
however, very clear that literacy tests are unconstitutional if they are used to 
engage in racial discrimination or if they are designed to facilitate racial 
discrimination.57 But where literacy tests are employed simply “to promote 
intelligent use of the ballot,” they are fully within the State’s discretion.58 The 
Court then upheld North Carolina’s literacy test, concluding that there was no 
evidence that it was used to discriminate on the basis of race.59 
Relying upon Lassiter, among many other cases, South Carolina was on 
firm ground in Katzenbach when it argued that it was well within its rights to 
implement a literacy test as prerequisite to voting. Of course, South Carolina 
conceded that it did not have a right to use literacy tests to discriminate against 
Black voters and it objected strenuously that it did so.60 It argued that voter 
turnout was low in the State because 20 percent of citizens are illiterate.61 
Moreover, it continued to stress that Congress did not have any evidence that it 
had used its literacy test to discriminate. When the Justices asked Attorney 
General Katzenbach at oral argument whether the federal government had 
contemporary evidence that South Carolina was using its literacy test to 
discriminate, Katzenbach conceded that the federal government did not have any 
such direct evidence.62 
In the dialect of racial justice scholars, South Carolina was objecting to the 
anticlassification orientation of the VRA. From the standpoint of formalism and 
separation of powers, the VRA was in fact unusual. South Carolina was not off 
base when it complained that Congress usurped the judiciary’s function through 
the coverage formula, which conclusively determined that certain jurisdictions 
were violating the Constitution.63 
 
 55. Id. at 51. 
 56. Id. at 50–51. 
 57. See id. at 53. 
 58. Id. at 51. 
 59. Id. at 53–54. 
 60. See Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 00:01:25 (“We believe that every man, white or 
black, . . . who possesses the reasonable qualifications proscribed by State should be permitted to vote.”). 
 61. See id. at 00:22:39–23:19 (“20% of our adult population is illiterate. . . . [A]ny state that has 
a large percent of illiterates and the literacy test that keeps them from voting, is always going to have a 
smaller percent of its population registered and a smaller percent that can vote . . . than a state either 
which has no literacy test or which has a small percent of illiterates.”). 
 62. See id. at 00:34:02 (with respect to Virginia); id. at 00:45:07 (arguing that one could concede 
at least of the possibility of discrimination in voting if you had problems as Virginia's had and South 
Carolina has had with respect to schools, with respect to public accommodations, with respect to other 
matters over the past years”). 
 63. See id. at 00:41:43–41:54 (arguing that under “the constitutional separation of powers,” parts 
of the Act “constitute . . . congressional adjudication” not legislation).  
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A Court employing a method of interpretation akin to or consistent with the 
anticlassification approach—as the Supreme Court would later do in Shelby 
County v. Holder—would have taken South Carolina’s constitutional objections 
very seriously, and those objections would likely have been fatal to the 
constitutionality of the statute. But the Court in Katzenbach ignored all of South 
Carolina’s constitutional arguments, it rejected the traditional approach to 
addressing racial discrimination, and it embraced the VRA’s antisubordination 
design: a raceconscious statute that emphasized a structural-institutional 
approach and placed disparate impact at its core through use of the coverage 
formula.  
In an opinion by Justice Warren, the Court recognized that Congress 
adopted a non-traditional framework for addressing racial discrimination, and in 
doing so “Congress exercised its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment in an 
inventive manner when it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”64 Warren also 
conceded that some of the Act’s remedial provisions reflected “an uncommon 
exercise of congressional power.”65 
Warren argued that Congress had tried the traditional approach to 
addressing racial discrimination and it had been woefully inadequate.66 Despite 
the federal government’s best efforts, the traditional approach was insufficient 
to root out systematic racial discrimination.67 “Congress concluded,” Warren 
explained, “that the unsuccessful remedies which it had prescribed in the past 
would have to be replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to 
satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.”68 Consequently, 
“[a]fter enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth 
Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and 
inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”69 
Warren’s opinion in Katzenbach is an instrumentalist account of 
constitutional interpretation. Warren justified the exercise of national power as 
necessary to repudiate and eradicate the South’s discriminatory practices. 
Ignoring altogether the standard account of constitutional interpretation, Warren 
argued in Katzenbach that the best way to understand Congress’s powers to enact 
the VRA and the best way to analyze the “constitutional propriety of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965” is “with reference to the historical experience which it 
reflects.”70 In other words, in Katzenbach, Warren essentially argued that we 
must judge the constitutional power of Congress to enact the VRA not against 
 
 64. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966). 
 65. Id. at 334. 
 66. See id. at 313 (“In recent years, Congress repeatedly tried to cope with the problem by 
facilitating case-by-case litigation against voting discrimination.”). 
 67. See id. at 328 (“Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat 
widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy 
required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits.”). 
 68. Id. at 309. 
 69. Id. at 328. 
 70. Id. at 308. 
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the traditional methods of constitutional interpretation—such as the text, the 
intent of the framers, or the structural values reflected in the Constitution—but 
against the very problem that Congress was trying to resolve. 
From the perspective of constitutional interpretation and constitutional 
theory, Warren’s reference to historical experience is a stunning statement from 
the Court. As every first-year constitutional law student is taught, constitutional 
interpreters derive constitutional meaning—that is, they try to determine how to 
understand the Constitution, by using a series of interpretive devices—what legal 
theorist Philip Bobbitt calls “modalities” of interpretation.71 But instead of 
adopting one or more of these usual methods, Warren asserts that we must 
understand the scope of Congress’s powers against the backdrop of the problem 
that Congress is trying to solve. Broad congressional power, from the point of 
view of Warren and the majority, is necessary to enable “millions of non-[W]hite 
Americans . . . to participate . . . on an equal basis in the government under 
which they live.”72 This is an admission by the Court that the Fifteenth 
Amendment—and likely the Fourteenth as well—was not a self-fulfilling 
constitutional provision. Accordingly, realizing the promise of the Fifteenth 
Amendment would depend on more than judicial enforcement and the traditional 
approach. After all, the necessity of the VRA is ipso facto evidence of the failure 
of the standard, court-exclusive model of voting rights enforcement. Katzenbach 
represented the Court’s early statement of support and cooperation with 
Congress on what the Katzenbach Court surely viewed as a joint mission to 
accomplish the dictates of the Reconstruction Amendments.73 
Just as importantly, Warren followed such an untraditional interpretive 
approach while applying the Court’s most deferential standard of review. The 
Court held, “the sections of the Act which are properly before us are an 
appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities and 
are consonant with all other provisions of the Constitution.”74 Stating 
unequivocally and forcefully: “The language and purpose of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the prior decisions construing its several provisions, and the 
 
 71. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). These modalities or 
interpretive devices include textualism, arguments from the text of the Constitution; arguments from the 
structure of the Constitution such as federalism, separation of powers, or even equal dignity of the states; 
arguments from the purpose of the Constitution, the purpose of the drafters, or their original intent; 
arguments from the Supreme Court’s prior precedents or doctrine; arguments from history or historical 
practices; and arguments from tradition, the way we have always done things. This list is not by any 
means exhaustive. For example, Bobbitt includes arguments from prudence and ethos as modalities of 
constitutional interpretation, and legal scholar Jack Balkin views arguments from consequences, natural 
law, and honored authorities as legitimate methods for understanding constitutional meaning. But the 
list includes the most common devices used, especially by courts, for deriving constitutional meaning. 
See Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional Interpretation, 33 
CONST. COMMENT. 145, 183–85 (2018). 
 72. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 337. 
 73. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: 
The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1403–04, 1404 n.67 (2015).  
 74. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308. 
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general doctrines of constitutional interpretation, all point to one fundamental 
principle. As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any 
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
discrimination in voting.”75 Put differently, as long as Congress is enforcing the 
Fifteenth Amendment by addressing the problem of racial discrimination in 
voting, it can use any method that is rationally related to that end. 
By applying such a deferential standard, Warren made clear that the Court 
was on Congress’s side and would not second-guess  Congress’s judgment. In 
the opinion, Warren stated that what matters—perhaps all that matters—in 
assessing whether the Constitution permits Congress to create the VRA is 
Congress’s experience of trying to resolve the country’s long-standing problem 
of racial discrimination in voting. Warren states this emphatically, almost self-
evidently: “The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must 
be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects.”76 What 
powers does Congress have to “effectuate the constitutional prohibition against 
racial discrimination”?77 His answer: whatever powers are necessary to eradicate 
racism. Chief Justice Marshall (via McCulloch v. Maryland) meets Malcom X: 
by any means necessary.78 
In addition, by deferring to Congress’s approach in the VRA, Warren 
summarily dismissed the argument from the covered states that Congress treated 
them unequally by respecting the sovereignty of some states and not the 
sovereignty of others. From Warren’s perspective, Congress had a clear basis for 
distinguishing among the states, because it “had learned that substantial voting 
discrimination presently occurs in certain sections of the country.”79 Some states 
had a worse history of racial discrimination than others, so Congress rationally 
“chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action 
seemed necessary.”80 In other words, the South was different. And it was 
different because it insisted on maintaining a system of political apartheid. And 
importantly, the Constitution did not prevent Congress from taking the South’s 
peculiarities into account.81 
Warren thus penned a sweeping endorsement of federal power deployed to 
address racial discrimination. This endorsement of federal power was 
accompanied by a healthy dose of epistemic deference to Congress’s judgment 
with respect to both its end and its means.82 The South’s history of racial 
discrimination demanded a non-traditional but structural solution to addressing 
 
 75. Id. at 324. 
 76. Id. at 308. 
 77. Id. at 326. 
  78. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413-14 (1819).  
 79. Id. at 328. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 329–31. 
 82. Id. at 324 (“As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational 
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”). 
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the problem of racism. The message of Katzenbach could not be clearer. For 
Warren and the Court, Congress had as much constitutional authority as it needed 
not just to address the problem of racial discrimination in voting but to eradicate 
it. 
Finally, Warren also does not shy away from retelling the country’s history 
of voting discrimination against Black Americans in particular.83 And that 
historical experience is one in which the Southern states, starting in 1890 and led 
by South Carolina,84 held constitutional conventions for the express purpose of 
disenfranchising their Black citizens. That historical experience also included 
the fact that the Southern states persisted for almost one hundred years in 
excluding Black voters from the franchise and therefore from governance and 
self-determination. And that historical experience reflected the futility of 
Congress’s repeated efforts, once it decided to once again enforce the promises 
of the Fifteenth Amendment, against the recalcitrance of the states. 
III. 
KATZENBACH AND PATHOLOGICAL RACISM 
If one were looking for a case to represent pathological racism and the 
antisubordination approach, one could do no better than South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, one of the most important voting rights cases ever decided by the 
Supreme Court. South Carolina v. Katzenbach is well recognized as an important 
case in the constitutional law and voting rights canons. But Katzenbach is also 
an important race case and ought to have pride of place in the race canon as well. 
The Court sanctioned and adopted Congress’s structural/institutional approach 
to addressing racial discrimination, which is remarkable enough and not 
sufficiently recognized by racial justice scholars. 
More importantly, the Katzenbach Court adopted the antisubordination 
approach—with its emphasis on structuralism/institutionalism, disparate impact, 
and raceconsciousness—to remedy racial discrimination not necessarily because 
it found that approach inherently compelling but because the antisubordination 
approach was the best way to get at pathological racism, the way in which the 
Court thought that racism manifested itself in American society. As a result of 
the historical and violent events that gave rise to the Civil Rights Movement, 
voting rights law and policy (beginning with Katzenbach) came to understand 
and define racism a pathogen or virus. It was exceptional. It was both irrational 
and evil. Voting rights law and policy understood racism in binary terms: it 
existed or it didn’t. Furthermore, racial progress was linear. Racism was an 
insidious act by the state and it could be eradicated with sufficient effort and 
 
 83. Id. at 308–13. 
 84. Id. at 310 & n.9 (“The South Carolina Constitutional Convention in 1895 was a leader in 
the widespread movement to disenfranchise Negroes.”). 
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strong medicine. Moreover, racism had a specific perpetrator; it did not exist in 
the ether. Racism was an evil executed by specific bad actors.85  
What made the South’s racism deserving of the moniker “pathological” was 
its particular virulence.86 These were the worsts of the worst and eradicating the 
evil that they perpetuated upon the body politic required departures from 
traditional constitutional principles. But there was always an assumption and 
expectation that society would vanquish racism and society would return to the 
proper constitutional baselines. We call this understanding of racism 
pathological racism. Constitutional law, whether the jurisprudence is framed as 
anticlassification or antisubordination, is quite responsive to pathological racism. 
In Katzenbach, the Court conceived of racism as a blight, a virus. Early in 
the opinion, within the third paragraph, Warren explains that the VRA “was 
designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, 
which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a 
century.”87 Interestingly, in the Moynihan Report, written by Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan in 1965, a year before the Court’s decision in Katzenbach, Moynihan 
describes racism as a “virus in the American blood stream [that] still afflicts 
us.”88 Racism is not just a “blight,” according to Katzenbach; it is also evil. 
Recall Warren’s observation in Katzenbach that Congress “felt itself confronted 
by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of 
our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”89 
 
 85. For commentators criticizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for adopting this view of 
racism, see, for example, Ekow N. Yankah, Pretext and Justification: Republicanism, Policing, and 
Race, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1543, 1599 (2019) (“For the Supreme Court, the only thing that could count 
as racism is the cinematic villain, the cop who wakes up intending to ticket, arrest or shoot a citizen 
precisely and only because he is Black. Whatever the right view of racism in our society, if there is such 
a thing as a right view, it surely cannot be such a simplistic one. While such racism remains, it is only a 
purposefully obtuse view that limits all discrimination to such hostility.”); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, 
Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. L. 
REV. 329, 344–45 (2006) (“As such, antidiscrimination law outlawed the obvious and explicit 
manifestations of racism (the ‘[W]hite only’ signs of the Jim Crow era) and thereby provided credible 
evidence that the law and the basic structure of society were fair, without disturbing the structural and 
systemic manifestations, including the maldistribution of resources, of that same deeply embedded 
racism.”); Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1389, 1393 
(1991) (reviewing ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM (1990)) (“Formal 
conceptions of equality treat racism as an anomaly, an illness, a sort of cancer on an otherwise healthy 
body. They are aimed at deviations from a status quo or baseline assumed to represent equality. If we 
spot such a deviation, we punish it. But most racism is not a deviation.”). 
 86. This is one of the reasons that the Court in Katzenbach continually referred to the type of 
racial discrimination that characterized the South as “evil.” See, e.g., Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. It 
was not just evil; it was also violent. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case 
Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 96 (2001) 
(“One of the most formidable obstacles to [B]lack voting in the rural South remained the threat and 
reality of physical violence.”).  
 87. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308. 
 88. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR 
NATIONAL ACTION (1965), https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/webid-moynihan 
[https://perma.cc/LV7W-65UE]. 
 89. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. 
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Warren used the word “evil” ten times in the opinion.90 It is very clear that when 
he used the word evil (and its plural, which he did once), he used it as a synonym 
for racism.91 The message here, whether articulated as a “blight” or as “evil,” is 
that racism is a particularly bad thing. Few words are better than “evil” and 
“blight” in the English language to communicate that a thing is particularly bad. 
Warren linked his constitutional analysis with Congress’s attempt to 
eradicate racial discrimination in voting. Warren was very clear and unflinching 
that racism, or perhaps more precisely racial discrimination in voting, was the 
“historical experience” that “confronted” Congress.92 Though Warren often uses 
the passive voice when describing how this virus infected the body politic, 
Katzenbach is fairly clear that the Southern states are the primary culprit. Warren 
does not shy away from retelling the country’s history of racial discrimination in 
voting against Black Americans in particular. It is noteworthy that Warren begins 
the history lesson in 1870, after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment and 
not in 1787 when the Constitution was written and ratified.93 The passage of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, of course, indisputably marks the Constitution’s 
commitment to racial equality in voting. But the story that Warren unfolds over 
many pages in Katzenbach is one of failure of the Fifteenth Amendment, not 
success. Twenty years after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, in 1890, 
the Southern states, including South Carolina, “enacted tests still in use which 
were specifically designed to prevent Negroes from voting.”94 Additionally, led 
by South Carolina, these states convened constitutional conventions for the 
express purpose of amending their respective state constitutions to disfranchise 
their Black citizens and sometimes, either intentionally or incidentally, their poor 
White citizens as well. 
As Warren describes, the reality of racial discrimination in voting almost 
one hundred years after the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment was not an 
indication of a lack of will by the Court or by Congress. Both institutions have 
tried over the years to address the problem. The Court’s initial efforts came in 
1915 in Guinn v. United States95 and Myers v. Anderson,96 which struck down 
grandfather clauses. Slightly more than a decade later, it opened up another front, 
 
 90. Id.; id. at 326; id. at 328; id.; id.; id. at 329; id.; id. at 330 (“In identifying past evils, Congress 
obviously may avail itself of information from any probative source.”); id.; id. at 331. 
 91. For example, the implication is clear from the following passage: “Congress had found that 
case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, 
because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics 
invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After enduring nearly a century of systematic resistance to the 
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the 
perpetrators of the evil to its victims.” Id. at 328. 
 92. Id. at 308–09. 
 93. Id. at 310. 
 94. Id. at 310 & n.9 (“The South Carolina Constitutional Convention in 1895 was a leader in 
the widespread movement to disenfranchise Negroes.”). 
 95. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
 96. 238 U.S. 368 (1915). 
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in Nixon v. Herndon, by holding that White primaries were unconstitutional.97 
Its next major move was in Lane v. Wilson, which confronted discriminatory 
voter registration.98 Finally, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court addressed racial 
gerrymandering.99 Warren remarked that the Southern states had long frustrated 
congressional and judicial sporadic attempts to enforce the promises of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. “Congress concluded that the unsuccessful remedies 
which it had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more 
elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.”100 
Turning to South Carolina’s efforts to frustrate voting rights, Warren 
highlights the views of South Carolina’s Senator Ben Tillman, whom Warren 
called “the dominant political figure in the state convention.”101 In justifying his 
State’s literacy test, Tillman said, “the only thing we can do as patriots and as 
statesmen is to take from [the ‘ignorant [B]lacks’] every ballot that we can under 
the laws of our national government.”102 With respect to the poll tax, Tillman 
bragged: “By means of the $300 clause you simply reach out and take in some 
more [W]hite men and a few more colored men.”103 Tillman illustrates both the 
racial order and its political oligarchy. Warren emphasized that the states made 
literacy a voting qualification and voter registration a prerequisite to voting. 
Making the connection that the Court refused to make in Lassiter, Warren 
explained almost matter-of-factly that the literacy device was effective because 
of the gap between White and Black literacy. States used various devices, such 
as “grandfather clauses, property qualifications, ‘good character’ tests and the 
requirement that registrants ‘understand’ or ‘interpret’ certain matter” to make it 
easier for illiterate White voters to vote.104 For almost one hundred years, the 
Southern states persisted in excluding Black voters from the franchise and 
therefore from governance and self-determination. 
Warren’s retelling of racial discrimination in the South and the VRA’s 
ability to address it illustrates his understanding of the nature of racism. Racism 
was not just an extreme irrational evil perpetrated in particular by the worst 
states; it was also curable. It could be eliminated or banished from the polity. By 
curing racism, we could cleanse the body politic and return it to its otherwise 
healthy state. Though racism was defeasible, it would only be so if we were 
willing to attack it with vigorous effort and strong medicine. This is precisely 
how the Court understood the VRA. Warren ended the opinion by expressing the 
hope that “millions of non-[W]hite Americans will now be able to participate for 
 
 97. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
 98. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). 
 99. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 100. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
 101. Id. at 310–11 n.9.  
 102. Id. at 310 n.9. 
 103. Id. at 310–11 n.9. 
 104. Id. at 311. 
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the first time on an equal basis in the government under which they live.”105 He 
then went on to quote the Fifteenth Amendment, stating: “We may finally look 
forward to the day when truly ‘[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’”106 
This was also a point that Attorney General Katzenbach made often. “We 
can draw only one conclusion from the story of Selma,” he told the House 
Judiciary Committee on March 18.107 “The 15th Amendment expressly 
commanded that the right to vote should not be denied or abridged because of 
race. It was ratified 95 years ago. Yet, we are still forced to vindicate that right 
anew, in suit after suit, in county after county.”108 Senator Dirksen made the 
point more clearly. “[I]t was 5 years after the conflict was over that the 15th 
amendment to the Constitution was approved,” he told his colleagues, “and it is 
a rather curious thing to see that 95 years later we have the problem of what was 
reassured in the 15th amendment in our laps all over again.”109 This was “a 
curious commentary upon history,” Dirksen reasoned, “that it has taken us so 
long to get this job done when the language of the 15th amendment is so very 
specific, that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or any State because of race or color and Congress in the second section of that 
amendment was given the power by appropriate means to effectuate it, the 
purposes and objectives of that article of amendment.”110 
The Court’s response to South Carolina’s specific objections to the Act also 
illustrate its reliance on pathological racism. Warren similarly and summarily 
dismissed the argument from the covered states that Congress treated them 
unequally by respecting the sovereignty of some states and not the sovereignty 
of others. From Warren’s perspective, Congress had a clear basis for 
distinguishing among the states: “Congress had learned that substantial voting 
discrimination presently occurs in certain sections of the country.”111 Some 
states had a worse history of racial discrimination than others. Congress 
rationally “chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate 
action seemed necessary.”112 In other words, the South was different. And it was 
different because it insisted on maintaining a system of political apartheid.  
 
 105. Id. at 337. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing on H.R. 6400 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
89th Cong. 9 (1965) (statement of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General of the United States), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/03-18-1965.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J7PC-JD8H]. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Voting Rights: Hearing on S. 1564 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 127 
(1965) (statement of Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois).  
 110. Id.  
 111. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
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The linchpin of South Carolina’s objection to the VRA was its contention 
that the coverage formula was unconstitutionally over- and underinclusive. 
South Carolina argued that the formula covered jurisdictions for which Congress 
did not have evidence of racial discrimination and did not cover jurisdictions that 
were known discriminators.113 In rejecting that argument, Warren noted that “in 
a great majority of the States and political subdivisions” subject to the coverage 
formula, specifically Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, Congress possessed 
“reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination.”114 The reliable evidence that 
Warren refers to is Katzenbach’s testimony before the House and Senate 
committees narrating the DOJ’s lawsuits in those three states, in which federal 
courts found that election officials were engaged in voting discrimination against 
Black voters, and also the inadequacy of litigation as a remedy for racial 
discrimination in voting. 
In other jurisdictions, Warren explained, namely, “Georgia and South 
Carolina—plus large portions of a third State—North Carolina— . . . there was 
more fragmentary evidence of recent voting discrimination mainly adduced by 
the Justice Department and the Civil Rights Commission.”115 Once again, 
Warren cited Katzenbach’s congressional testimony as supporting evidence. 
From Warren’s perspective, this “more fragmentary evidence” was sufficient to 
justify coverage.116 To the extent other jurisdictions were swept into the 
coverage provision even though Congress did not have direct evidence that those 
jurisdictions were engaged in racial discrimination, Congress was “entitled to 
infer a significant danger” of racial discrimination in those jurisdictions based 
upon the fact that those jurisdictions shared two characteristics with jurisdictions 
for which Congress did have evidence of racial discrimination: they required a 
test or device as a prerequisite to voting and they have a voting rate below the 
national average.117 This was the key to the Court’s opinion. 
For example, in discussing why the suspension of literacy tests was not 
unconstitutional, the Court stated, “The record shows that in most of the States 
covered by the Act, including South Carolina, various tests and devices have 
been instituted with the purpose of disenfranchising Negroes, have been framed 
in such a way as to facilitate this aim, and have been administered in a 
discriminatory fashion for many years.”118 The requirement that covered 
jurisdictions had to get federal permission before they could implement their 
voting laws was constitutional because it was the only effective way to prevent 
 
 113. See Oral Argument, supra note 45, at 00:36:07–36:18 (arguing that the “sections are not 
tailored to the known problem here; it doesn’t cover States where Congress was told of a massive 
discrimination. It does cover States where there was no discrimination”). 
 114. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 329. 
 115. Id. at 329–30. 
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remedies.”). 
 117. Id. at 329–30. 
 118. Id. at 333–34. 
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states with a history of discrimination from discriminating in the future. And if 
Congress overshot by covering states and localities that were not engaged in 
systematic racial discrimination, the Act “provides for termination of special 
statutory coverage at the behest of States and political subdivisions.”119 Lastly, 
with respect to underinclusiveness, Congress did not need to cover states and 
localities that discriminated by means other than tests or devices. “It is irrelevant 
that the coverage formula excludes certain localities which do not employ voting 
tests and devices but for which there is evidence of voting discrimination by 
other means.”120 Congress could address those states later or in a different way. 
Thus, Warren concluded, “the coverage formula is rational in both practice and 
theory.”121  
South Carolina v. Katzenbach made clear that Congress may treat states 
unequally on the basis of past racist actions. In so doing, the Court seemed to 
have interred the theory of state sovereignty, at least when deployed against 
Congressional regulation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment and perhaps even 
against any federal statute enacted to enforce any of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. At the very least, Katzenbach seemed to have settled, once and for 
all, all constitutional controversies over the power of Congress to promulgate the 
most controversial provisions of the VRA. Warren also appeared to have 
unceremoniously entombed the objection that Congress must treat the states 
equally when it is trying to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. The 
Court’s answer to South Carolina’s complaint that Congress violated the 
Constitution by treating the Southern states as conquered provinces was not even 
to dignify the inquiry with a rebuttal; Warren simply justified the treatment on 
the fact that the South deserved to be treated differently. Katzenbach looked like 
a “super-precedent,” an iconic Supreme Court case that established fundamental 
constitutional principles, like Marbury v. Madison or Brown v. Board of 
Education, both of which are dyed within the fabric of American law and 
society.122 Though Katzenbach was not on the order of Brown, it certainly looked 
like it was the next level down.  
In sum, Congress (through the VRA) and the Court (through Katzenbach) 
instinctually justified the antisubordination orientation of the VRA, and thus its 
constitutionality, on the basis of pathological racism. Katzenbach and the Court’s 
voting rights jurisprudence justified the VRA as necessary to address a 
 
 119. Id. at 331. 
 120. Id. at 330–31. 
 121. Id. at 330. 
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particularly virulent disease, racism—the pathogen that attacked an otherwise 
healthy body politic. Remedying this disease would require strong medicine. The 
VRA was the strong medicine and the expectation was that it would cure the 
disease, and afterward the cure—the VRA—would no longer be necessary. Once 
cured, the body could return to its normal functioning. This was the Court’s 
understanding of racism. 
Pathological racism anchored the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence. It 
justified the Court’s approach to federalism, state sovereignty, sectionalism, and 
the Act’s disparate treatment of the states. The VRA model worked as long as 
the conception of racism that supported the VRA was sufficiently explanatory of 
how racism operated in the world. Pathological racism was the lever that turned 
everything: the Court’s institutional support for the Act; the Court’s 
understanding of federal power, state sovereignty, and sectionalism; and the 
Court’s approval of Congress’s differential treatment of the states. Once 
pathological racism lost its explanatory power, the structural/institutional 
underpinnings of the VRA would also be imperiled. 
IV. 
THE DEMISE OF PATHOLOGICAL RACISM 
Though he would likely be horrified, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in 
Katzenbach, which upheld the challenged provisions of the VRA in broad and 
strong terms, provided the blueprint for Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Shelby 
County, which struck a critical blow to the VRA and will likely lead to the Act’s 
demise. Roberts draws his conception of racism directly from Katzenbach, the 
case that best demonstrates the theory of pathological racism. 
To the extent that voting rights lawyers and legal academics assumed 
Katzenbach conclusively resolved the question of federal power to address 
voting discrimination in favor of the federal government and against the states, 
that assumption turned out to be incorrect. Additionally, to the extent that voting 
rights scholars assumed that Katzenbach irrefutably and permanently ratified the 
structural/institutionalist orientation of the VRA, that assumption also turned out 
to be mistaken. In Shelby County v. Holder, almost fifty years later, Chief Justice 
Roberts resurrected the arguments that seemed buried, almost unceremoniously 
so, in Katzenbach and held that the coverage formula was unconstitutional.123 
While voting rights activists have criticized Shelby v. Holder, they should also 
see it as proof that the conception of pathological racism in the VRA no longer 
mirrors today’s understanding of racism. 
 
 123. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (recounting the history of the 
Fifteenth Amendment and later concluding, “Congress could have updated the coverage formula at that 
time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) 
unconstitutional.”). 
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In Shelby County v. Holder,124 Chief Justice John Roberts authored an 
opinion, in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined, 
concluding that the coverage formula in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is 
unconstitutional. The coverage formula identifies the jurisdictions that Congress 
thought needed federal oversight—covered jurisdictions—because those 
jurisdictions were relentlessly engaged in racial discrimination in voting. The 
coverage formula singled out jurisdictions for federal oversight pursuant to two 
criteria.125 Covered jurisdictions were those that used a literacy test as a 
prerequisite to voting and in which less than 50 percent of the voters in that 
jurisdiction were registered to vote or turned out to vote in the presidential 
election in 1964.126 If a jurisdiction met both criteria, under section 4 of the Act, 
Congress suspended its literacy test—or any test or device used by the 
jurisdiction as a prerequisite to voting.127 Additionally, under section 5 of the 
Act, the jurisdiction was required to “preclear” or get permission from either the 
Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia128 for any new changes—changes made after November 1, 1964—to 
its voting laws. 
Congress has periodically reconsidered the coverage formula, and other 
than minor changes made in 1970 and in 1975, the content of the coverage 
formula has been the same since 1975 and its basic structure has not significantly 
changed since 1965. Congress revisited the formula in 1982 and 2006 and 
decided to maintain the status quo for twenty-five years each time.129 Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts declared that the VRA was an 
extraordinary remedy that “employed extraordinary measures to address an 
extraordinary problem.”130 Roberts explained that the coverage formula and 
preclearance provisions of the VRA “depart[]” from “basic principles” of 
federalism, sovereignty, and equal state doctrine.131 In other words, the VRA 
allocates to Congress power over elections that belongs to the states—the 
federalism problem. Roberts writes: “Outside the strictures of the Supremacy 
Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and 
pursuing their legislative objectives.”132 Federalism—the balance of power 
between the federal government and the states—“preserves the . . . residual 
sovereignty of the States” and thereby “secures to citizens the liberties that derive 
from the diffusion of sovereign power.”133 
 
 124. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 125. See Voting Rights Act § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 438. 
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 127. See id. 
 128. The jurisdiction could get permission from both if it wanted to. Voting Rights Act § 5. 
 129. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 538–39 (2013). 
 130. Id. at 534. 
 131. See id. at 535. 
 132. Id. at 543  
 133. Id. (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011)). 
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In addition to issues of federalism, the VRA treats the states differently by 
requiring some to preclear their voting changes but not others. This is the equal 
sovereignty problem. “Not only do States retain sovereignty under the 
Constitution, there is also a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among 
the states.”134 Equal sovereignty among the States is a fundamental tenet of the 
constitutional compact and necessary to the proper functioning of the Republic. 
Roberts argued that the VRA “sharply departs from these basic 
principles.”135 It allocates to the federal government responsibilities that belong 
to the States.136 And, it treats the States differently. “While one State waits 
months or years and expends funds to implement a validly enacted law, its 
neighbor can typically put the same law into effect immediately, through the 
normal legislative process.”137 Roberts explained that these departures from 
fundamental principles were justifiable in 1965, when Congress enacted the Act, 
and in 1966, when the Court first considered its constitutionality in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach.138 Quoting Katzenbach, Roberts implies that the VRA 
was justified when enacted because the ‘“blight of racial discrimination in 
voting’ had ‘infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a 
century.’”139 The covered jurisdictions enacted laws specifically designed to 
make it harder for African Americans to vote. Moreover, the federal government 
did not have any useful tools at its disposal to combat racial discrimination in 
voting. At best, the federal government could sue the States. But litigation took 
time and it was very inefficient. 
In other words, Roberts argued that the coverage formula, and by extension 
the preclearance requirement, “made sense” in 1965 and in 1966 because 
Congress targeted the jurisdictions most likely to engage in racial 
discrimination.140 Specifically, the Southern states, could only be trusted to 
disenfranchise their citizens of color. Shifting power to the federal government 
and treating the states unequally was necessary, then, to address the entrenched 
scourge of racial discrimination. Further, Congress also targeted the devices that 
these discriminators used most often, specifically, the literacy test. The coverage 
formula was ‘“rational in both practice and theory’” because it “accurately 
reflected those jurisdictions uniquely characterized by voting discrimination ‘on 
a pervasive scale,’ linking coverage to the devices used to effectuate 
discrimination and to the resulting disenfranchisement.”141 
 
 134. Id. at 544.  
 135. Id. 
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 140. See id. at 546. 
 141. Id. 
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Though the VRA was necessary in 1965, however, Roberts reasoned that 
“[n]early 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”142 The imprecision 
resulting from the colloquial expression “things” is undoubtedly intended by the 
Chief Justice, who is otherwise particular, precise, and pellucid when he chooses 
to be. Gesturing toward his target, euphemistically and once again with 
presumably deliberate imprecision, he noted, “the conditions that originally 
justified these measures”—the coverage-preclearance tandem—“no longer 
characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.”143 Leaving aside the perhaps 
intentional and frequent obliqueness, the “things” and “conditions” that have 
changed undoubtedly refer to racial discrimination in voting, though the phrase 
“racial discrimination” is infrequently invoked.144 Shuttling between divagation 
and directness, Roberts reflected toward the end of the opinion, “[o]ur country 
has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress 
must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current 
conditions.”145 Similarly, this time toward the beginning, he observed, conceding 
and parrying, that “voting discrimination still exists, no one doubts that. The 
question is whether the Act’s extraordinary measures, including its disparate 
treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional requirements.”146 
From the perspective of the majority in Shelby County, the Act’s broad 
measures were no longer constitutionally sound, because racial discrimination in 
voting is no longer reflective of the modal experience of voters of color engaging 
the political process. Roberts noted that when Congress first enacted the VRA, 
it was “strong medicine,” which “Congress determined . . . was needed to 
address entrenched racial discrimination in voting.”147 He remarked that the 
VRA’s provisions were “unprecedented” and because they were unprecedented, 
they were intended to be temporary.148 As soon as Congress solved the problem 
of racial discrimination in voting, we would return to a traditional understanding 
of the powers of Congress and the division of responsibility between the federal 
government and the States. 
Accordingly, in one fell swoop, Shelby County removed two significant 
pillars of the VRA, leaving mainly section 2 of the Act. As a result, the VRA is 
unable to prevent, as it did in its heyday, many state and local laws that 
negatively impact voters of color. Shelby County functionally neutered what 
former Solicitor General Donald Verrilli called an “iconic statute and an 
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important part of American history.”149 Verrilli, who argued and lost the case 
before the Supreme Court, remarked ruefully that Shelby County is “the loss he 
most regrets” because of the “powerful real-world consequences that followed 
very quickly from that decision.”150 Verrilli was of course not the only one to 
lament the outcome in Shelby County. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
similarly protested that Shelby County “has left millions of minority voters 
vulnerable to voter suppression schemes in towns, counties and states across the 
country.”151 
Since the case was decided, Shelby County has become a symbolic rallying 
cry for voting rights activists—in the same manner that the Supreme Court’s 
campaign finance decision of Citizens United has been both a point of anguish 
and a rallying cry for advocacy groups concerned about the role of money in 
politics. It is now reflexive to cite Shelby County for the ills of voting rights law 
and practice. Additionally, Shelby County’s impact has taken on added 
significance as Congress has been unable to accept the Court’s “invitation” to 
fix the part of the statute struck down by the case. The promise of a “Shelby fix” 
is at best remote and most likely a hollow hope.  
The Court’s decision and reasoning in Shelby County have been widely 
criticized by many voting rights scholars, including us.152 Voting rights activists 
but also some scholars see Shelby County as directly responsible for the 
significant demise of the VRA as an effective regulatory regime. These, and 
similar criticisms of Shelby County are understandable. After all, the Court struck 
down an important provision of the statute, the coverage formula, and by so 
doing, sidelined another important provision, the preclearance requirement, 
which is designed to assure that covered jurisdictions will not discriminate in the 
future. Furthermore, based on the Court’s reasoning in Shelby County, section 2 
of the statute, its last remaining significant provision, is more vulnerable than 
ever.153 Thus, it would surprise no one if the Court, relying largely on the 
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reasoning of its Shelby County opinion, struck it down. Unquestionably, the 
decision has had a tremendous impact on the voting rights landscape. The 
Court’s decision in Shelby County has shrunk the footprint of a statute scholars 
once regarded as a super-statute and what some have described as the most 
substantial voting rights statute enacted by Congress. 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the potentially destabilizing effects of 
the Court’s decision in Shelby County, the slow unravelling of our modern voting 
rights framework goes well beyond Shelby County. To blame Shelby County 
misses the deeper problem with our current statutory and constitutional approach 
to voting rights enforcement. 
A new time has come. State officials no longer disregard judicial decrees. 
Registration rates in the South have reached near parity between Black and 
White voters.154 Congress banned literacy tests nationwide for nearly forty years 
and thus the States’ primary discriminatory tool has been banished from the 
political landscape for nearly a century. Things have changed. 
Pathological racism no longer defines American voting practices. Black 
voters register and vote at similar rates as White voters in the covered 
jurisdictions. Black candidates are electable—and elected—to federal, state, and 
local offices. State officials, in the South and elsewhere, can no longer be 
branded by their singular desire to deprive Black people of political power 
because of racial animus. This is largely due to the fact that “[t]he tests and 
devices that blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 
40 years.”155 Just as importantly for Chief Justice Roberts and the majority, the 
North and the non-covered jurisdictions are, by and large, not exempt from 
voting problems; some of the current voting problems manifest themselves in the 
North as well as the South. And yet, notwithstanding the diminution if not 
eradication of racial discrimination in voting and the evolution of voting 
problems, Congress has failed to update the coverage formula to account for 
these changes. Consequently, the VRA can no longer justify the federalism and 
equal sovereignty “costs” of its coverage formula and  preclearance provision 
that led the Court to reject these provisions as unconstitutional.156 
Shelby County thus reflects the fact that the moral, political, and ultimately 
constitutional consensus over a particular understanding of racism, pathological 
racism, has dissipated. When the VRA was enacted in 1965, we knew what the 
problem was and who the bad actors were—the Southern states in particular. 
Consequently, we successfully managed to avoid a fight over identifying and 
defining racial discrimination in voting rights law and policy. With the 
dissolution of that collective understanding, the issue of race and racism is back 
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on the drawing board. Shelby County is the most expressive and visible 
manifestation of that unraveling. Pathological racism no longer drives voting 
rights law and policy. Shelby County is a clear indication that pathological racism 
no longer provides the constitutional and conceptual for voting rights law and 
policy. What accounts for the majority’s argument that that racism is no longer 
the central driving concern in the domain of voting? Roberts’s understanding of 
racism reflects a conception of racism that we call pathological racism. However, 




Roberts’s opinion in Shelby County prompted a sharp rebuke from Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a dissent joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan. Justice Ginsburg took issue with Roberts’s argument that racism no 
longer characterizes the modal voting experience of Black voters. “In the Court’s 
view,” she declared, firing her first opening salvo, “the very success of § 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act demands its dormancy.”157 The question for Justice Ginsburg 
was whether the Court ought to defer to the judgment of Congress on the 
continued need for the coverage formula-preclearance regime or whether the 
Court was entitled to make its own judgment.158 This was more or less a 
rhetorical inquiry. Justice Ginsburg more than tipped her hand when she 
characterized Congress as the entity “charged with the obligation to enforce the 
post-Civil War Amendments ‘by appropriate legislation.’”159 
Justice Ginsburg argued that Congress had two reasons for maintaining the 
current coverage formula. These reasons also justify judicial deference to the 
judgment of Congress. First, the coverage-preclearance tandem is “the remedy 
that proved to be best suited to block . . . discrimination.”160 And it remains 
necessary because racial discrimination continues to be a problem in voting. 
Ginsburg reviewed the evidence of contemporary instances of racial 
discrimination before Congress. She noted that between 1982 and 2006, the 
preclearance mechanism allowed the DOJ to stop “over 700 voting changes” 
from going into effect “based on a determination that the changes were 
discriminatory.”161 Moreover, a significant portion of those changes reflected an 
intent to discriminate. Thus, “[a]lthough the VRA wrought dramatic changes in 
the realization of minority voting rights, the Act, to date, surely has not 
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2021] CHRONIC RACISM, PATHOLOGICAL RACISM & UNIVERSALISM 1135 
eliminated all vestiges of discrimination against the exercise of the franchise by 
minority citizens.”162 
Second, coverage and preclearance are necessary to “guard against 
backsliding.”163 Ginsburg argued that coverage and preclearance are responsible 
for the progress against voting discrimination for which the VRA is lauded. 
Congress designed the coverage formula and the preclearance process “to catch 
discrimination before it causes harm, and to guard against return to old ways.”164 
Ginsburg explained, “Volumes of evidence supported Congress’ determination 
that the prospect of retrogression was real.”165 Ginsburg then deployed the 
analogy that has made her Shelby County dissent immediately iconic. “Throwing 
out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop 
discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in rainstorm 
because you are not getting wet.”166 She explained that the VRA was designed 
to address the “persistence” of racial discrimination in voting.167 
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts, whose conception of racism was 
informed by pathological racism, Justice Ginsburg was searching for a different 
conception of racism, one that is more reflective of how racism operates in our 
society. Racial justice and antidiscrimination scholars have long wrestled with 
Justice Ginsburg’s task, which is how to articulate a conception of racism that 
reflects the reality of our country’s racial hierarchy. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is 
more consistent with an approach that we call chronic racism. Chronic racism 
conceptualizes racism as ever present, routine, permanent, mundane, rational, 
and deeply woven within the cultural, socioeconomic, and legal fabric of our 
nation.168 From this frame, racism is continuous; it exists on a spectrum of more 
or less as opposed to in a binary of is or isn’t. It waxes and wanes; it can manifest 
itself in extreme ways or in more subtle and insidious ways. It embeds itself 
within its host, opportunistically, and it is not always easily identifiable.169 
While Roberts’s opinion shows the downsides of pathological racism, 
Ginsburg’s dissent illustrates the difficulty of using chronic racism as the 
justification for structural racism. Structural/institutional remedies are hard to 
justify without an endpoint. Put differently, though chronic racism is a more 
accurate description of how racism operates in American society, it is a less 
compelling justification compared to pathological racism, for the structural and 
institutional approaches. This is because chronic racism is hard to prove and, by 
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definition, chronic racism is not solvable. Consequently, the structural and 
institutional remedies designed to cabin it are arguably without an endpoint. 
Ginsburg responded to these difficulties in two ways. Responding to the 
first difficulty, she repaired to epistemic deference. Ginsburg chastised the 
majority for its failure to simply defer to the judgment of Congress that the 
structural remedies of the VRA remained necessary.170 In a move that’s 
reminiscent of Warren in Katzenbach, she underscored the record that Congress 
compiled when Congress reauthorized the coverage-preclearance regime in 
2006.171 She could have added that the record Congress compiled in 2006 was 
more extensive than the record that it compiled in 1965. This suggests that 
Katzenbach did not turn entirely on the record but on the fact that pathological 
racism was an undeniable reality of the American landscape in 1965. 
Roberts’s response to the argument that the Court should have deferred to 
the substantial record compiled by Congress again illustrates the point that the 
doctrinal fight is really about pathological racism. Whatever one might say about 
how voluminous the record was, Roberts maintained, “no one can fairly say that 
it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and 
‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly 
distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that 
time.”172 In other words, whatever one might say about the record compiled by 
Congress, it does not show pathological racism. 
Ginsburg responded to the second challenge, that chronic racism is endemic 
and a permanent feature of our body politic, by facing it head on. Structural 
remedies are necessary, she argued, because of the way that racism evolves and 
morphs.173 It is true, she conceded, that “conditions in the South have 
impressively improved since the passage of the Voting Rights Act.”174 But she 
noted that racism does not present itself in the same way at all times: “[c]ongress 
also found that voting discrimination had evolved into subtler second-generation 
barriers, and that eliminating preclearance would risk loss of the gains that had 
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been made.”175 And seemingly bringing home the point of the chameleon-like 
aspect of racism, she remarked that “[s]econd-generation barriers come in 
various forms.”176 Because racism maintains this chameleon-like 
characteristic—“the evolution of voting discrimination into more subtle second-
generation barriers”—structural and institutional approaches are necessary to 
respond to the various manners in which racism might present itself.177 
Roberts refuted Ginsburg’s argument simply by pointing to the fact that 
Congress did not design the coverage formula and preclearance to address 
second-generation barriers. “[A] more fundamental problem remains,” he 
contended, “Congress did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage 
formula grounded in current conditions. It instead reenacted a formula based on 
40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”178 If Congress 
had used the record and evidence of second-generation barriers, Roberts argued, 
it would have covered a different configuration of jurisdictions than those 
covered by the extant formula. 
Roberts’s rejoinder makes clear how difficult it is, in fact, to design 
structural remedies that are capable of recognizing and classifying a problem that 
can be so subtle and so protean. We noted earlier how difficult it was for 
Congress to prove racism even in a world of pathological racism. For example, 
recall that both Attorney General Katzenbach and the Court through Chief 
Justice Warren in South Carolina v. Katzenbach conceded that Congress had at 
best fragmentary evidence that South Carolina used its literacy test to 
discriminate.179 If identifying and proving racism is surprisingly difficult in a 
world of pathological racism, identifying and proving racism is almost an 
impossible task in a world of chronic racism. 
Our most popular or modal model of racism remains pathological racism. 
One can try to explain how structural and institutional racism contribute to the 
overrepresentation of Black people in the criminal legal system or how policing 
might be harmful to the Black community, but it is not as convincing as seeing 
a police officer with his knee on a Black man’s neck until the man can no longer 
breathe. This is one of the reasons contemporary scholars of racial justice use the 
phrase “Jim Crow” (or Jane Crow, its gendered equivalent) as both metaphor and 
 
 175. Id. at 575–76.  
 176. Id. at 563.  
 177. Id. at 592–93 (“In truth, the evolution of voting discrimination into more subtle second-
generation barriers is powerful evidence that a remedy as effective as preclearance remains vital to 
protect minority voting rights and to prevent backsliding.”). 
 178. Id. at 554 (majority opinion). 
 179. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329–30 (1966) (“To be specific, the new 
remedies of the Act are imposed on three States—Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi—in which 
federal courts have repeatedly found substantial voting discrimination. Section 4(b) of the Act also 
embraces two other States—Georgia and South Carolina—plus large portions of a third State—North 
Carolina—for which there was more fragmentary evidence of recent voting discrimination mainly 
adduced by the Justice Department and the Civil Rights Commission. All of these areas were 
appropriately subjected to the new remedies.”) (emphasis added). 
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description.180 The concept of Jim Crow is not just evocative—it is also intended 
to resolve an epistemic dilemma by indicating to us that we have identified 
something that can be appropriately labeled racism. However, notwithstanding 
the evocative power of the Jim or Jane Crow metaphor, it fails utterly as a 
descriptor. 
VI. 
THE TURN TOWARD (TARGETED) UNIVERSALISM 
We have argued so far that the problem with the Supreme Court’s racial 
justice jurisprudence is not its unwillingness to adopt structural or institutional 
approaches to destabilizing the racial hierarchy. The problem is the Court’s 
conception of racism. Racial justice scholars have three possible strategies for 
advocating for structural/institutional remedies. First, they can operate as if we 
live in a world of pathological racism and demand structural and institutional 
remedies to address contemporary manifestations of racism. To the extent that 
this strategy works at all—it might be a nonstarter because of skepticism about 
pathological racism—support for structural and institutional remedies collapse 
once skepticism about pathological racism takes hold. This is the clear lesson of 
the VRA and the Katzenbach case. 
Second, racial justice scholars can advocate for structural and institutional 
remedies using chronic racism as a justification. However, as we showed in the 
previous part, this path is also likely to lead to a dead end. To rehearse, this is for 
two reasons. First, identifying and proving racism when its manifestation is 
subtle and when it is constantly morphing turns out to be quite hard. Second, 
because it is really hard to identify and prove racism in a world of chronic racism, 
the temptation is to analogize and equate contemporary manifestations of racism 
to its pathological equivalents. But this takes us right back to the problems of 
pathological racism. 
There is, however, a third option that racial justice scholars have not 
explicitly probed but should. They should explore universalist solutions as 
remedies for structural and institutional racism. Universal policies are public 
policies or public benefits provided by the state that are open to all.181 Examples 
include public education or health care or a universal basic income.182 An 
approach toward universalism focuses on the structural underpinning of racial 
 
 180. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
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 181. See, e.g., Racism Tests France’s Colour-Blind Model, ECONOMIST (Jan. 16, 2021), 
https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/01/16/racism-tests-frances-colour-blind-model 
[https://perma.cc/ST6Z-62V8] (describing that a “universalist model assumes that all citizens have equal 
rights as individuals, not groups”). 
 182. See generally JOHN A. POWELL, STEPHAN MENENDIAN & WENDY AKE, HAAS INST. FOR A 
FAIR & INCLUSIVE SOC’Y, TARGETED UNIVERSALISM: POLICY & PRACTICE 7 (2019) (“Universal 
policies are those that aspire to serve everyone without regard to group membership, status, or income. 
They often establish a goal or minimum protection for the general population.”).  
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inequality instead of ameliorating its effects.183 Consider race-based affirmative 
action in higher education as one example. One could view affirmative action as 
an attempt to remedy the effects of an unjust and unequal educational system.184 
Instead of pursuing racial justice in education primarily by defending affirmative 
action efforts, racial justice advocates could instead try to realize a true right to 
education in which human flourishing is not constrained by race, class, 
geography, or other arbitrary characteristic. The government ought to be 
obligated to provide a quality education to all of its citizens who endeavor to 
acquire one. 
There are many reasons that racial justice scholars may be reluctant to 
explore universalist solutions. For example, one could argue that pursuing a 
universalist solution might be viewed as denying racism’s causal role in creating 
and maintaining America’s caste system. Universalist solutions might be viewed 
as conceding the terrain to those who think that racism plays a minimal role in 
unequal outcomes. Additionally, universalist solutions might be viewed as too 
blunt of an instrument to be effective. For example, they might counter 
antidiscrimination efforts.185 If the problem is racism, the solution ought to fit 
the problem. A one-size-fits-all universal approach is a satisficing move but fails 
to implement the types of targeted changes that would have the most impact on 
people of color. Indeed, one might legitimately worry that a blunt universal 
approach might exacerbate racial inequality. 
While we think there is merit to those objections, they are not without 
answers. We do not deny that some universalist solutions might be advocated 
and implemented in a manner that is inconsistent with the racial justice agenda. 
The same could be said for race-based solutions as well. Nor do we deny that 
universalist solutions might paint with too broad of brush to be effective. But 
universalist solutions and approaches are not all alike. For example, Professor 
john a. powell has called for universal approaches that are targeted to address 
structural and racial inequality.186 Moreover, sometimes universalist solutions 
are the most radical solutions on the table and the best answers for addressing 
deep structural and institutional racial inequalities.  
As importantly, critiques of universalist approaches miss an important 
insight. In some cases, universalist solutions are necessary precisely because we 
are operating in a world of chronic racism and targeted racial solutions are either 
difficult to identify or they can never be effective. Put differently, a turn toward 
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 186. See powell, supra note 1. 
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universalism forces us to ask what the state owes its citizens, all of them, and 
demands the provision of social services adequate to meet the needs of all of its 
citizens.187 Race sometimes obscures the urgency and necessity of the demand. 
Consider for example the calls to defund the police or to abolish the prison 
system. These are radical and universalist solutions. They reflect a worry that 
even the best targeted racial solutions will be unable to contain the insidious 
ways in which chronic racism has embedded its itself into the very fabric of those 
institutions and the concern that there are no targeted race solutions that can 
reform those institutions. In the same vein, we have called for universalist 
solutions to structural and institutional racial discrimination in voting.188 This is 
not because we think racial discrimination is no longer a problem in voting, in 
fact the opposite. Though racism is not the only problem in voting, we 
understand chronic racism to be the best description for how racism operates in 
voting and in American society. 
In our view, universal solutions to voting problems have always been the 
radical solution. Abolitionists, such as Frederick Douglass, advocated for a 
universal solution to voting.189 The suffragettes did as well.190 Interestingly, 
today we regard the VRA as radical—and many voting rights advocates are 
willing to defend a very narrow version of the VRA, simply because it deploys 
racially-targeted solutions. But civil rights advocates in the 1960s viewed the 
VRA as mild, in part because it did not sufficiently deploy what we would today 
regard as universalist solutions.191 
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CONCLUSION 
Racial justice scholars have spent the better part of the last fifty years or so 
building a case for an antisubordination approach for antidiscrimination law. In 
our view, the antisubordination paradigm is fatally flawed because it depends 
upon a pathological view of racism that is not reflective of the chronic 
manifestation of racism in our polity. Racial justice scholars, in particular critical 
race theorists, have long recognized, as Professor Athena Mutua nicely put it, 
that racism is “endemic to the American normative order and a pillar of 
American institutional and community life.”192 A central, if not the central, 
lesson from Derrick Bell’s work is that racism is a permanent feature of the 
American landscape.193 Indeed, it is because racial justice scholars believe that 
racism is permanent or endemic to the American socio-political order that racial 
justice scholars have advanced a structural/institutional approach addressing the 
problem of racism in American life.  
If racism is best viewed as chronic, as we believe it is, the question is 
whether we can expect the state to provide race-specific remedies for the long 
term and whether even if the government did so, whether we can expect the 
Court’s antidiscrimination jurisprudence to uphold such remedies. In our view, 
both outcomes are unrealistic. In order to address racial inequality, racial justice 
ought to be more willing to explore universalist solutions to chronic racism. We 
ought to make the case for what the state owes its citizens, all of them, to allow 
them to flourish. 
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